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Abstract 
 
This paper explores habit as a foundational concept for routines research. We examine how habit 
and habitus have been conceptualized in psychology and sociology, giving particular attention to 
the role of deliberation and mindfulness. Drawing on this work, we develop a typology of habit 
that is based in the extent of deliberation by the individual performing an activity, and the 
variability in the conditions in which he/she performs it. We consider the implications of these 
insights on habit for two central perspectives of organizational routines, the capabilities 
perspective and the practice perspective, arguing that both can be advanced by closer attention to 
the idea of routines as interlinked habits. 
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The Multiplicity of Habit: Implications for Routines Research 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of habit has drawn considerable attention in the research on organizational 
routines. Routines, as repetitive patterns of interactions (Becker 2004), have been described as 
the organizational analogue of individual habits (Hodgson 2003). Scholars have also explored 
the idea that routines result from the interlinking of individual habits, reflecting connections 
between individual learning and organizational routines (Cohen 1991; Cohen and Bacdayan 
1994). This work has recently received renewed attention as part of efforts to strengthen the 
micro-foundations of organizational routines (Cohen, Levinthal, and Warglien 2014; Felin et al. 
2012; Winter 2013).  
 
While the value of habit as a core element of the microfoundations of routines is viewed 
differently across central perspectives in the literature (i.e., routines as capabilities, routines as 
practice), these perspectives have tended to adopt a similar view of habit as the automatic 
response dispositions of individuals (Knudsen 2008; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). 
But in recent work, Cohen (2007; 2012) has been critical of this view of habit and has argued in 
favor of drawing upon conceptualizations of habit that see it as more flexible and generative. 
Whereas traditional views of habit as automatic emphasize its independence from conscious 
thought and its tendency to fire (and misfire), alternative conceptualizations tend to characterize 
habit as “pre-reflective”, but entirely compatible with intentional and intelligent behavior. These 
differences in approaches and terminology across disciplines have made it difficult to understand 
the role of habit in individual behavior, which in turn inhibits the potential for habit to strengthen 
our understanding of organizational routines.  
 
In this chapter, we aim to contribute to this understanding by clarifying some of the 
relationships between habit, deliberation, and mindfulness that are part of current debates in 
routines research (Laureiro-Martinez 2014; Levinthal and Rerup 2006; Winter 2013). To do so, 
we review how habit has been conceptualized in different research traditions. While work on 
habit in routines has primarily drawn from psychology (e.g., Dewey 1922; James 1890), we 
examine a wider spectrum of perspectives, encompassing both psychology and sociology. 
Drawing on this work, we develop a typology of habit that takes a broader and more integrative 
look at the concept. This typology provides an avenue for further understanding how routines 
unfold over time (e.g., Langley et al. 2013), suggesting that the stability and dynamics of 
routines as interaction patterns depend, in no small part, on the different types of habits that 
shape the behavior of routine participants. In the discussion section, we consider the implications 
of these insights on habit for the capabilities and practice perspectives of routines (Parmigiani 
and Howard-Grenville 2011; Turner 2014). While these perspectives differ in many ways, we 
argue that both can be advanced, and perhaps drawn closer together, through a broader 
conceptualization of habit. 
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2. LITERATURE BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Routines as Interlinked Habits 
 
Research on routines as interlinked habits views routines as sequential patterns of action 
that are based in the interconnected, reciprocally-triggering habits of routine participants. The 
roots of this view are based in earlier efforts to draw connections between organizational routines 
and individual learning (e.g., Cohen and Bacdayan 1994), drawing primarily on psychological 
research examining procedural and declarative memory. Procedural memory, which is viewed as 
central for habits, involves remembering how to perform actions; this form of memory tends to 
persist, has little accessibility to language and conscious thought, and has limited tolerance for 
novel conditions. Because it is not easily accessible to conscious thought, procedural memory 
provides an important mechanism that supports individuals' dispositions to act in similar ways in 
response to similar circumstances without going through a deliberative process. By contrast, 
declarative memory centers on facts and concepts, and it tends to be more subject to decay, more 
accessible for conscious thought (e.g., deliberating among alternative courses of action), and 
more tolerant of novel conditions (Cohen 1991).  
 
The idea of routines as interlinked habits suggests that routines emerge through a process 
of gradual learning by participants in the routine, and become stored in procedural memory 
(Cohen et al. 1996). In experimental research, Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) found evidence 
consistent with the idea of routines being stored as procedural memory; specifically, the 
researchers found that as pairs of individuals formed routines for playing a card game, the 
routines were not impacted by the introduction of time delays (i.e., decay), but were impaired 
when novel conditions were introduced. In this manner, a routine can be viewed as a 
concatenation of individual habits, each stored in procedural memory (Cohen et al. 1996), with 
the corresponding actions of participants primed by and priming the actions of others. This is 
similar to the notion of “habit meshing”, which Weick (1969: 58) described as how “each 
person's habits are part of the environment of others” within organizations.  
 
Thus, as the routine forms, the initially distinct action dispositions of individuals tend to 
coalesce into a cohesive whole, such that the routine in aggregate represents a collective 
disposition (Hodgson 2003; Knudsen 2008), which can result in the performance of “seemingly 
automated” sequences of actions (Narduzzo et al. 2000). In related research, Dionysiou and 
Tsoukas (2013) argue that the formation and interlinking of these action dispositions coincide 
with the development of shared schemata among routine participants; specifically, their work 
emphasizes that stability in routines reflects the development of shared schemata that guide 
meaningful interactions among participants, and action dispositions stored in procedural memory 
that contribute to participant responses in more automatic and unreflective ways. 
 
While the idea of routines as interlinked habits may suggest a rather automatic, machine-
like view of routines, a key issue is the way in which the underlying habits are conceptualized. 
Some scholars (e.g., Knudsen 2008) have viewed habit as automatically triggered by contextual 
cues, consistent with contemporary research in psychology (Wood and Neal 2007), while others 
(e.g., Cohen 2007) have drawn upon a broader conceptualization of habit as proposed by Dewey 
(1922), which emphasizes that habits can be mindless and automatic in the extreme, but they can 
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also exhibit dynamic and mindful qualities. What is habit, then, and how is it viewed in different 
research traditions in psychology and sociology? 
 
2.2 Habits 
 
Although the term “habit” has been used in different ways across different disciplines, 
Camic (1986: 1044) proposes that habit has a common core meaning: “a more or less self-
actuating disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action.” 
Around this common core, scholars of habit vary in their views, particularly regarding whether 
the form of action is simple, circumscribed, and automatic versus generalized, complex, and 
deliberate (Camic 1986). 
 
While consideration of habit was common in early work in psychology and sociology, the 
evolution of the disciplines led to psychologists focusing largely on the automatic notion of 
habit, and the virtual disappearance of habit from sociological discourse (Camic 1986).i More 
recently, though, sociology has seen a reemergence of scholarly attention in this area, focusing 
largely on the notion of habitus and general/complex forms of behavior (Bourdieu 1990). 
 
In this section, we provide a brief review of three related areas of research. First, we 
consider the dominant view in psychology on habit, where habits are defined as response 
dispositions that are automatically triggered by cues in the performance context (Wood and Neal 
2007). Second, we examine recent work in sociology on habitus, which arose in opposition to the 
traditional view of habit in psychologyii (Bourdieu 1990). Last, we consider earlier work in 
psychology by Dewey (1922), and related phenomenological work by Merleau-Ponty (1962), 
that has received less attention and argues for a broader conceptualization of habit.  
 
2.2.1 Dominant View in Psychology on Habit 
 
Psychologists have long relied on the concept of habit for understanding our daily lives. 
William James (1939) argued that individuals are “mere bundles of habits”, and suggested that 
99%, perhaps 99.9%, of daily activity is habitual.  
 
Concept of habit. In psychology, much of the attention directed to habits has focused on 
fairly simple and automatic actions. Early roots of this line of thought can be found in the work 
of James (1890), who argued that with habit formation comes diminishment in the conscious 
attention with which individuals perform their activities, and further spoke of habits in terms of 
“automatic agency” (1890: 31). In more recent work in psychology, scholars have defined habits 
as response dispositions that are automatically triggered by cues in the performance context. In 
this sense, habits represent learned associations between stable contextual features and responses 
(Neal, Wood, and Quinn 2006). In diary studies, Wood, Quinn, and Kashy (2002) classified 
habits as behaviors that participants report performing “just about every day” and “usually in the 
same location” (Wood et al. 2002: 1285).  
 
Habit development and performance. According to this view, habits develop gradually as 
individuals do the same things in the same context. In this process, associations are formed in 
memory between the actions/responses and the stable features of the context in which they are 
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performed (Wood and Neal 2009). As these associations in memory form, there is greater 
integration of actions within sequences, resulting in the cueing and implementation of larger 
units of behavior that require little conscious control to proceed to completion (Neal et al. 2006). 
While the pursuit of prior goals may have led individuals to perform activities similarly under 
similar conditions, once habits are established, they are automatically triggered by cues in the 
performance context. In this work, scholars highlight that the physical location where responses 
are performed provides the cues that trigger many everyday behaviors (Wood and Neal 2009). 
Research by Wood et al. (2005) found that a number of everyday habits can transfer/persist 
across settings -- specifically for students transferring from one university to another -- when 
aspects of performance context are similar in both settings. 
 
While habits have a persistent memory trace in general, scholars in psychology have also 
considered how cognitive resources may strengthen or weaken the likelihood of engaging in such 
behaviors. For example, when individuals are distracted, they have less working memory 
available to generate alternative courses of action, and as such, they are more likely to act 
habitually (Wood and Neal 2009). Recent work has also focused on the role of self-
control/willpower resources, which Wood and Neal (2009: 583) describe as a “domain-general 
resource that functions like a muscle in that it is temporarily depleted with use and regenerates 
with rest.” In related diary studies, scholars have found that the most effective strategy for 
inhibiting habitual responses is one of vigilant resistance using self-control/willpower resources 
(Quinn et al. 2010); however, when such resources are low, individuals are typically unable to 
inhibit the habitual response or choose other courses of action (Neal, Wood, and Drolet 2013). 
Scholars also suggest that efforts to change habitual behaviors are more likely to be effective 
when they are based in or coincide with interventions that disrupt the environmental cues that 
would otherwise automatically trigger the habit (Verplanken and Wood 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Reemergent View in Sociology on Habitus 
 
Concept of habitus. While the field of sociology ceded the study of habit to psychology in 
the early twentieth century, prominent contemporary scholars in sociology like Mauss (1973) 
and Bourdieu (1990) have refocused attention in this area, particularly on the notion of habitus. 
For Mauss and Bourdieu, habitus differs from habit, in that habitus focuses on intelligent 
dispositions and practical understanding while habit refers to mechanical, stimulus-response 
forms of behavior (Crossley 2013a). 
 
While the concept of habitus has evolved over time (Crossley 2013b), in general, it refers 
to a system of stable dispositions, which are based in past experiences. Habitus are generative 
systems with the capacity to produce an infinite number of practices, but the range of such 
practices is limited in diversity by the corresponding embodied schemata that guide perception, 
appreciation, and action (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). A habitus can be 
viewed as an acquired ability to do certain sorts of things, i.e., a form of competence, and 
represents a prereflective and embodied mastery of certain types of situations. Using the analogy 
of sport, Bourdieu (1990: 66) sees habitus as the “feel for the game” that enables players to act in 
intelligent ways even when the speed of the game inhibits their ability to think reflectively about 
their next move (Crossley 2013b). In this way, habitus “captures the skilled activity of the expert 
player rather than the conditioned response of the lab rat” (Crossley 2013a: 139). 
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Habitus development and performance. According to Bourdieu (1990: 53), habitus are 
“structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures.” In this sense, the habitus 
is produced by a particular class of conditions, and the habitus as a system of dispositions serves 
as the basis for perceiving, appreciating, and acting. The primary structuring influences on 
habitus are based in social class and historical era (Crossley 2013b). Given that individuals of the 
same class or era tend to be exposed to the same conditions, they tend to develop the same 
habitus (Bourdieu 1990). As a result, habitus “captures the way in which the individual is shaped 
by their own history which, in turn, is shaped by the wider historical process to which they 
belong,” thereby implying a “situated form of agency which emerges from and draws upon a 
collective history” (Crossley 2013b: 295). 
 
Moreover, habitus also develops and redevelops through experiences that reinforce and 
modify its structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Early experiences are particularly 
influential, as the schemata emerging from them form the basis through which new information 
is selected (Bourdieu 1990). As experiences accumulate, there tends to be a relative closing of 
the open system of dispositions constituting the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In this 
sense, the habitus is “a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future by reactivation 
in similarly structured practices” (Bourdieu 1990: 54).  
 
2.2.3 Reformed View of Habit 
 
In the work of Mauss (1973) and Bourdieu (1990), dissatisfaction with the more rigid 
notion of habit developed in psychology led to their use of habitus as a more complex, dynamic 
and generative concept. Other scholars like Dewey (1922) in psychology and Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) in phenomenology had similar concerns with the narrow and rigid view of habit, but 
rather than reject the concept, they chose to rehabilitate and extend it (Crossley 2013a). Recent 
work in the organizational sciences by Cohen (2007) has also adopted this broader 
conceptualization of habit. 
 
Concept of habit. While the dominant view in psychology conceptualizes habit with 
respect to automaticity (Wood and Neal 2007), early work by Dewey (1922) advocated for a 
broader conceptualization. At one extreme of a continuum, Dewey understood habit as consistent 
with the dominant view in psychology -- that is, habit as automatically triggered by contextual 
cues without thought or feeling -- which he described as “routine habit”. But at the other 
extreme, Dewey (1922) viewed habit as more flexible and lively, which he described as 
intelligent or artistic habit. In similar ways, phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1962) saw habit as 
an acquired ability to respond to situations of a particular form with certain ways of acting. This 
end of the continuum compares favorably with the notion of habitus used more recently in 
sociology (Bourdieu 1990; Mauss 1973). 
 
Further, while the dominant view in psychology suggests that habits based in 
automaticity are pervasive (James 1890; Wood et al. 2002), Dewey suggested that this form of 
habit represents a pathological extreme that is not often reached. Specifically, he argued that all 
habit-forming activity begins down a path toward thoughtless/automated action. However, 
“nature which beckons us to this path of least resistance also puts obstacles in the way of our 
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complete acceptance of its invitation,” and through these obstacles, “a signal flag of distress 
recalls consciousness to the task of carrying on” (1922: 173). 
 
Habit development and performance. Dewey (1922) emphasized that habit is a 
disposition to particular ways of action that is acquired through past experience. According to 
Dewey, though, habits could develop in different ways depending on their type; for example, 
“routine habits” would develop and be limited by repetition of past acts in past conditions, 
whereas a flexible habit would grow more varied and adaptable through experience. In similar 
ways, Merleau-Ponty (1962) viewed the process of habit formation as one in which an individual 
acquires the ability to respond with a certain type of action to situations that bear similar 
characteristics but are in no way identical; thus, there is flexibility of habit in that individuals are 
acquiring an ability for doing something, based on learning a relation of meaning between 
situational properties and responses. As an example, Merleau-Ponty (1962: 142) described 
“forming the habit of dancing” as “discovering, by analysis, the formula of the movement in 
question, and then reconstructing it on the basis of the ideal outline by the use of previously 
acquired movements, those of walking and running.” Moreover, this work argues that habits 
form on the basis of ongoing interactions between the actor, other actors, and the broader 
environment, and re-form based on the continuing course of these interactions which include 
ongoing disturbances (Crossley 2013a). 
 
In general, Dewey (1922) viewed habits as repertoires of potential behavior that can be 
triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context, and that a habit exhibits unexpected 
potentialities when performed in a different context from the one in which it was established. 
From this view, habit is a more generative notion in that habits can be drawn upon, adapted, and 
reorganized for different purposes in different conditions. In this way, Cohen (2007; 2012) saw 
habits as flexible and as resources for improvising, although he also acknowledged the difficulty 
in efforts to reshape habit through conscious intervention. 
 
2.2.4 Summary 
 
With increasing attention focused on strengthening the microfoundations of routines 
(Felin et al. 2012), habit has been put forward as a central component (Cohen 2007; Winter 
2013). The potential of habit to fulfill this role is, however, constrained by extant views of the 
concept among routines scholars. While many see habit similarly (i.e., based in automaticity), 
our review shows that this is a restrictive perspective. We observe that the reformed view of 
habit advanced by scholars like Merleau-Ponty and Dewey (on which Cohen 2007 builds), and 
the notion of habitus as developed by Mauss and Bourdieu, have substantial overlap, with both 
characterizing habit more broadly than, and in many ways different from, the dominant view of 
habit as understood in psychology. These “alternative” views of habit see it as the ability to act 
competently in a prereflective but intentional and intelligent way, which contrasts markedly with 
the dominant view of habit in psychology which sees it as non-reflective, automatic response to 
known stimuli, which can be prone to misfire and only overcome through considerable 
willpower. The commonalities and divergences in the treatment of habit highlighted here point to 
a need for developing a more integrative and coherent understanding of habit. In the following 
section we explore the relationships among contextual features, deliberation, and mindfulness 
within our habit typology. 
 7
3. A TYPOLOGY OF HABIT 
 
At its core, habit represents an acquired tendency to engage in an activity in particular 
ways (Camic 1986). But as evident from the related scholarship in psychology and sociology, 
there are different perspectives on habit that are based in differences in the extent of automaticity 
by the individual performing the activity, and the variability of the conditions in which he/she 
performs it. In this section, we develop a typology of habit that explores and accounts for these 
differences (Figure). We then use this typology as a basis to discuss the relationships between 
habit and mindfulness.  
 
*** Insert Figure Here *** 
 
In our typology, we use activity to indicate the larger task that is being performed, such 
that its performance is reflected in a sequence of underlying actions. An example of an activity 
would be driving from home to work. This activity is composed by the actions of entering the 
car, starting its engine, and so on.iii Our typology focuses on habits that can be viewed as 
established, and does not consider the performance of an activity prior to habit formation. 
 
The first dimension, variability in performance conditions, refers to the extent to which 
features of the context in which the activity is performed are different across its enactments. 
Scholars in psychology have argued that variability in performance conditions has important 
implications for habit, as habit formation involves the development of associations in memory 
between actions and stable contextual features (Verplanken and Wood 2006). At a more 
aggregate level, organizational scholars suggest stability in the operating environment of 
organizations has important implications for routinization of activities (March and Simon 1958). 
Similarly, researchers in sociology have argued that the stability of performance conditions plays 
a key role in the formation of habitus (Bourdieu 1990; Crossley 2013a). Scholars from this 
tradition, as well as those advocating for a reformed view of habit, have also underscored how 
variability in conditions can produce varied performances of the same habit (Bourdieu 1990; 
Dewey 1922).  
 
Our second dimension captures the extent to which deliberation enters into habitual 
behavior, either in supporting or disrupting it. The term deliberation is used widely in the debate 
on routines, but it is rarely explicitly defined. According to Merriam Webster, deliberation refers 
to “careful thought or discussion done in order to make a decision.” Dewey (1922: 190), on 
which much of the current attempts to revisit the notion of habit in routines are based, defines 
deliberation as “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of 
action.” Similarly, Winter (2013) highlights that deliberation aligns closely with System/Type 2 
processes in dual processing accounts of individual behavior. System/Type 2 processes tend to 
be relatively slow, conscious, abstract, rule-based, and connected with consequential decision-
making, while System/Type 1 processes tend to be relatively fast, automatic, non-conscious, 
associative, and involved in experience-based decision-making (Evans 2007). 
 
In our typology, the automatic habit, which often involves fairly simple activities, is habit 
as understood in modern psychology (Wood and Neal 2007). Automatic habit is typically 
developed and performed in stable conditions, and for the individual actor, there is little 
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deliberation within the performance of the activity. The latter is emphasized in neuroscience 
research (Jog et al. 1999) showing how, when a particular activity is performed, the underlying 
actions tend to become “chunked” together, with recordings of neuronal activity suggesting 
limited deliberation taking place within the sequence of actions (with greater signs of 
engagement at the beginning and end of the sequence). This corresponds with one extreme of the 
habit continuum from the reformed view of habit, which Cohen (2007: 780) describes as “dead” 
habit. Dewey (1922: 172-173) suggested that for an individual, habit at this extreme is “a ditch 
out of which he cannot get, whose sides enclose him, directing his course so thoroughly that he 
no longer thinks of his path or his destination... stimulus and response are mechanically linked 
together in an unbroken chain.” This corresponds to the idea of habit as rejected by Bourdieu 
(1990), in favor of habitus. 
 
The contested habit reflects recent scholarly attention by psychologists (Neal et al. 2013). 
With contested habit, the focus is also on activities performed in stable conditions, but the 
process involves a greater level of deliberation by the individual. In particular, the contested 
habit is based on recent research that examines the juxtaposition of habit and willpower, 
examining the role of self-control/willpower in inhibiting the performance of particular patterns 
of action (Quinn et al. 2010). In contrast to traditional habit, with contested habit, high levels of 
deliberation work to inhibit a response, or to "will apart" an otherwise chunked sequence of 
actions. Bourdieu (1990: 108) also notes that “[habitus] may be superseded in certain 
circumstances … by other principles, such as rational and conscious computation.” This also 
reflects the juxtaposition of will and “dead” habit described by Dewey (1922), although habit can 
also be changed through prereflective improvisation.  
 
For activities that are performed in varying/dynamic conditions, and involve relatively 
low deliberation, we enter the realm of skillful habit.iv This refers, for instance, to the “feel for 
the game” of a footballer (Bourdieu 1990). Here the individual is able to adapt her behavior to 
the changing conditions in which the activity is carried out (e.g., the spatial distribution and 
movement of players, the ball in motion) in a way that is largely prereflective, but still purposive 
and displaying intelligence and understanding of the situation (Crossley 2013a). 
 
Finally, when the performance conditions are varying and deliberation is high, habit can 
be viewed as infused with deliberation, i.e., infused habit. This recognizes the unexpected 
potentialities of “a flexible, sensitive habit” (Dewey 1922: 72) that can generate different action 
sequences based on different conditions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), and represents an 
ability that can be called upon when facing “new emergencies” (Dewey 1922: 66). While skillful 
habit represents a prereflective and almost instinctive adaptation of behavior given encountered 
conditions, infused habit involves greater deliberation and engagement in the behavior. This 
quadrant captures “the infusion of thought [into habit] that Dewey spoke of, which solves 
surmountable problems around the edges of existing skills and routines, thereby enhancing the 
scope and adaptability of existing habits” (Winter 2013: 134). 
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3.1 Habit and Mindfulness 
 
The typology developed above offers insights for the relationship between habitual 
behavior and mindfulness, which in turn, has implications for our understanding of the linkage 
between routinization and mindfulness. We begin by concentrating on the individual level of 
analysis, consistent with our focus in this section on the relationships between habit and 
individual behavior. In reviewing psychological research on mindfulness, Dane (2011) argues 
that most studies share a common core understanding of mindfulness as the self-regulation of 
attention so that it is (1) focused on immediate experience, both internal to the person (e.g., 
emotional states) and external (i.e., the environment) and (2) has wide breadth. Dane (2011) 
further argues that this differentiates mindfulness from other states of attention, such as 
absorption (when attention is narrowly concentrated on the task at hand), counterfactual thinking 
and prospection (when attention is concentrated on the past or on the future), and mind 
wandering (when attention is broad and not directed to the present). Some approaches, notably 
that of Langer (1989), see mindfulness as involving cognitive differentiation through the creation 
or refinement of distinctions and categories.v 
 
When characterized as self-regulated, wide-breadth attention to one’s experience (Dane 
2011; Glomb et al. 2011), mindfulness directs attention to a wider range of details in the context 
and how one is dealing with it, and in this way enriches the information that is selected into the 
deliberation process. For instance, Langer (1989: 153) argues that “mindfulness is a choice of 
contexts. The mindlessness-mindfulness distinction is concerned with how we create information 
or assign meaning to to-be-processed information.” However, mindfulness, as a state of 
attention, does not necessarily imply deliberation. Heightened attention increases the input that 
we process, but that processing might not take place through the language-based, cognitive 
activities that we usually associate with deliberation. A skilled football player, to go back to 
Bourdieu’s example, is certainly mindful of her surroundings as she adapts her actions to the 
speed of the ball, the disposition of other players, and her own physical situation, but we define 
her as skillful because in many circumstances she knows what to do without deliberating about it 
– as a novice and less skillful player would need to do.     
 
Our typology suggests that all types of habit, with the exclusion of automatic habit, are 
mindful because they require attention and adaptation to the context. Skillful habit, as illustrated 
by the performance of a skilled football player, requires mindfulness primarily with an external 
focus. Contested habit requires mindfulness primarily with an internal focus, on the operation of 
the body or mind, while infused habit requires focus on both internal and external dimensions, as 
the actor consciously attempts to adapt habit in the face of variations in context.  
 
These ideas have implications for understanding the link between routinization and 
mindfulness. While some authors emphasize trade-offs between routinization and mindfulness 
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2006), others argue that they sustain each other at individual (Laureiro-
Martinez 2014) and organizational levels (Levinthal and Rerup 2006; Rerup and Levinthal 
2014). From the perspective of our typology, whether or not routinization at an organizational 
level sustains mindfulness can depend on the type of habit that predominates for participants. 
When automatic habit dominates, routines are mindlessly executed on the basis of a few salient 
cues in the environment. An example of this may be the case, discussed in Cohen and Bacdayan 
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(1994), of Soviet troops arriving in Cuba secretly and in civilian clothes, only to form into ranks 
and march away in formation. When other types of habits dominate, however, the performance 
of routines can be mindful. This appears to be the case, for instance, in the processes underlying 
both local/lower-level and global/higher-level variations in routines for new product 
development at Alessi (Salvato 2009). In that case, mindful employees reacted to local problems 
by generating some variation, and mindful top managers picked up on successful variations and 
institutionalized them. In our view, the idea of “infused habit” might help to explain the micro-
foundations of routine evolution in similar cases, including how bottom-up (operational) and top-
down (strategic) processes are linked (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012) in ways that prevent 
organizational adaptation from being driven by sudden and dramatic “wake up calls” of serious 
crises (Rerup and Levinthal 2014).    
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, we consider habit as a foundational concept for routines theory, building on 
the recent attention directed to habit by routines scholars (Cohen 2012; Winter 2013). While 
habit has traditionally been viewed through the lens of psychology, focusing on the automatic 
triggering of actions in stable conditions, our study offers a broader and more integrative look at 
the concept. Specifically, we develop a typology of habit, which is rooted in work on habit and 
habitus from psychology and sociology, and we explore the role of mindfulness in the different 
forms of habit. We believe that this perspective offers considerable potential to further 
understanding of the microlevel foundations of routines theory.  This integrative view of habit 
offers important implications that extend understanding of two core perspectives in the routines 
literature: the capabilities perspective and the practice perspective (Parmigiani and Howard-
Grenville 2011). 
 
4.1 Implications for Research on the Capabilities Perspective of Routines 
 
The capabilities perspective typically examines routines as whole entities, and focuses on 
their role as building blocks of organizational capabilities (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 
2011). Our study offers insight for the capabilities perspective in two primary areas: the role of 
individuals, and the role of context. 
 
4.1.1 The Role of Individuals 
 
Capabilities-based scholars have not historically focused closely on how individuals 
shape routine enactment, which in part has spurred recent calls for greater foundational 
understanding of routines (Felin et al. 2012; Salvato and Rerup 2011). Yet this research does 
argue that routine participants are faced with competing tensions, often viewed as a trade-off, 
involving deliberation -- its absence enables fluid performance of habits of limited scope in 
familiar conditions, while its presence broadens the scope of action across a wider range of 
conditions, but typically does so at the expense of disruptions in behavior (Nelson and Winter 
1982; Winter 2013).vi While viewing such tensions as a trade-off between fluidity/efficiency and 
adaptability/flexibility focuses on habit and deliberation as separate concepts, scholars have 
called for greater attention to understanding the interplay between habit and deliberation, and the 
corresponding implications for routines and capabilities (Winter 2013). And there have been 
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parallel calls to provide a clearer understanding of the relationships between mindful and “less-
mindful” behavior in relation to routines (Levinthal and Rerup 2006). 
 
Our typology of habit, and consideration of mindfulness within it, helps us to better 
understand how the type of habit influences the balance among these competing tensions. First, 
we highlight that two habit types -- automatic and contested -- are quite consistent with how 
capabilities-based scholars tend to view the tension as a deliberation trade-off. For automatic 
habit, there is little, if any, deliberation among routine participants, which enables fluid 
performance of habits in stable conditions. With contested habit, there is deliberation on the part 
of participants with mindfulness directed internally, with the typical objective to inhibit an 
undesired performance of habit. Second, we highlight that skillful habit and infused habit -- both 
present in varying conditions -- are less consistent with extant views. For skillful habit, there is 
less of a trade-off present between fluidity/efficiency and adaptability/flexibility, as there is little 
deliberation involved for routine participants, but by being mindful of external conditions, they 
are able to attain both fluid and adaptive performance of habit. In the case of infused habit, we 
argue that there is not separation between habit and deliberation, as deliberation is actively 
enrolled in the performance of infused habit (with mindfulness directed both internally and 
externally). 
 
These insights have important implications for research into the micro-foundations of 
routines and capabilities because they suggest that scholars need to look beyond a monolithic 
view of habit, and take into account multiple forms of habit that are present in different 
conditions (i.e., stable versus varying) and involve deliberation and mindfulness in different 
degrees and ways. Future research should include efforts to examine the performance 
implications of routines depending on which habits prevail (e.g., routines built primarily on 
automatic habit vs. infused habit), as well as the processes through which multiple types of 
habits intermesh in routines. Moreover, our study encourages future research to move beyond a 
bipolar view of the individual actor, moving like a pendulum between habit and deliberation, and 
instead to focus more closely on the varied relationships between habit and deliberation. As one 
example, deliberation itself may be a habit, as in the view of Dewey (1922), particularly when it 
is recognized in the “learnt” way of professionals reasoning about their task. In addition, work on 
mindfulness has begun to shed light on the multiple ways in which automatic and mindful 
behavior support and co-constitute each other at both individual and organizational levels 
(Laureiro-Martinez 2014; Levinthal and Rerup 2006).  As discussed earlier, our typology of 
habit can help to further unpack these processes.   
 
4.1.2 The Context of Routines 
 
In the routines literature, the idea that routines are context-dependent is a fundamental 
one (Cohen et al. 1996). Consistent with this idea, scholars working from the capabilities 
perspective have tended to view the material context as external structures that trigger and 
channel the actions of participants performing a routine (Becker 2004). At an individual level, 
this aligns with the “automatic habit” tradition of research arguing that stimuli from the 
environment automatically trigger the performance of habits (Wood and Neal 2007). This 
connects with the idea that the affordances of objects (i.e., the possibility for action that an object 
offers) can be processed in automatic ways (Cohen 2012; Gibson 1979). But our study also 
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points to other ways in which artifacts and context come into play in relatively automatic ways 
for individuals performing routines. For example, Merleau-Ponty's (1962) discussion of how a 
blind person uses a stick for perceiving suggests that some artifacts are in fact mediators of 
behavior, in the sense that they influence the nature of behavior rather than simply “trigger” it. 
This suggests that context is part of habit in a generative way, and that individuals can 
resourcefully use artifacts while performing habits. Building on work on the role of materiality in 
organizations (e.g., Cacciatori 2012; Leonardi, Nardi, and Kallinikos 2012), and on research that 
examines how some artifacts (e.g., procedures) can stimulate and/or suppress deliberation, 
mindfulness and ultimately agency (Adler and Borys 1996), offers promise for advancing 
understanding of how different types of artifactual conditions affect the emergence and 
flexibility of routines. 
 
Moreover, context dependence is based on the idea that routine effectiveness depends on 
the alignment between routines and their surrounding conditions (Nelson and Winter 1982). But 
in recent work focusing on routine replication, capabilities-based scholars have argued that 
effectiveness depends less on fit with local conditions, and more on maintaining the internal 
coherence of the routine. Specifically, this research has found that as organizations seek to 
transfer routines to new locations, their performance improves with exact replication, as opposed 
to adapting the routine to fit the context (Szulanski and Jensen 2006). This work raises important 
questions regarding the value of replication versus adaptation for organizational routines, and 
whether routines may be less dependent on context than previously thought. 
 
Contributing to this debate, our study suggests that the value from exact replication 
versus contextual adaptation may depend upon the habits of routine participants. For example, 
when routines are based largely in automatic habits, organizations may benefit from pursuing a 
strategy of exact replication because the internal coherence of a routine is more salient with 
automatic habits at its foundation (i.e., greater chunking of behavior). By contrast, when the 
underlying habits for a routine are infused ones, organizations may benefit from greater 
adaptation to the local environment because there are fewer problems associated with disturbing 
the internal coherence of the routine. Future research can advance this debate through greater 
attention to how the habits of routine participants are (and are not) dependent upon different 
aspects of context; in these efforts, scholars may benefit from drawing upon psychological 
research on affordance (Gibson 1979) and contextual influences on habit (Wood et al. 2005).  
 
In addition, findings from the research on routine replication suggest that context is 
“layered.” Maintaining internal coherence of routines requires replicating exactly the artifactual 
and organizational arrangements of a routine; that is, it focuses on the immediate context for 
participant actions. This immediate context might or might not fit with the larger context as 
reflected in the wider organizational and market conditions, such as cultural norms. Our typology 
suggests that different forms of habit may be predominant at different contextual levels. While 
automatic habit may be predominant in relation to the immediate context in routines, “outer” 
layers of context seem to call more upon habit as practical knowledge (i.e., skillful and infused 
habit) to perform in particular classes of situation and cultural context. A “layered” view of 
context, together with the typology of habit that we propose, may help future research to explore 
how routines nest into other structures of the organization (Howard-Grenville 2005). 
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4.2 Implications for Research on the Practice Perspective of Routines 
 
The practice perspective focuses on the internal structure of routines. From this 
perspective, routines are viewed as comprising ostensive aspects (i.e., the abstract pattern of 
actions) and performative aspects (i.e., the enactment of the pattern of actions), and as effortful 
and ongoing accomplishments (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Our study also offers insight for 
scholars working from the practice perspective in the areas of the role of individuals and context. 
 
4.2.1 The Role of Individuals 
 
Routines scholars working from the practice perspective have emphasized the agency of 
routine participants, focusing on specific actions taken by specific individuals at specific times 
and in specific places (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). To this point, practice-based 
routines researchers have given relatively little attention to the potential role of habit in the 
micro-foundations of routines, which is not surprising given the level of attention directed to the 
concept of automatic habit in psychology (Wood and Neal 2009), and its general inconsistency 
with the idea of routines as effortful accomplishments. In fact, the emphasis on agency -- and the 
view of routines as practices that must be accomplished -- is put forward in contrast to the idea 
that routines are simply based in the mindless, automatic habits of individuals. However, in work 
exploring the temporal orientation of actors, agency scholars have argued that when actors are 
primarily oriented to the past, there is a habitual aspect of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). 
Drawing on this research, Howard-Grenville (2005) argues that when participants are oriented to 
the past, there is little flexibility and change in routines. 
 
While prior work has tended to equate the habitual aspect of agency with past temporal 
orientation, our typology suggests that different forms of habit may involve different forms of 
temporal orientation. Consistent with prior work, automatic habit aligns with past temporal 
orientation, and we would expect little flexibility and change in routines based in such habits. 
However, if routines are based in skillful habit, we would expect greater orientation to the 
present (i.e., adapting to the circumstances at hand), and greater flexibility in the routine. If 
routines involve contested habit, we would expect that participants are simultaneously oriented 
to the past and present, with present intentions and resources (i.e., willpower) seeking to inhibit 
tendencies for past iterations, and with the flexibility and change in routines dependent upon the 
balance among competing pressures. For routines based in infused habit, participants may be 
simultaneously orientated to the past, present, and future; for example, actors may draw on 
patterns of action established in the past as resources that can be modified and/or recombined to 
enable more effective functioning in the present or future; in these instances, we would expect 
greater flexibility and change in routines. Future research into the habitual aspect of agency -- 
including the different forms that habit may take, and the different temporal orientations that 
may be at play -- offers considerable potential for advancing understanding of the practice 
perspective of routines. 
 
In addition, practice approaches to routines generally consider agency and structure to be 
co-constituted (Feldman and Pentland 2003). However, practice-based studies of routines have 
tended to give primacy to agency and have provided a less developed account of the role of 
structure in the dynamics of routines – partly as a reaction to a view of routines as rigid and 
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automatic. Unlike habit in the dominant psychology tradition, the work on habitus and related 
research on the reformed view of habit is more social in nature. Mauss and Bourdieu, for 
instance, both underscore that habitus is formed in and shaped by the social groups in which 
individuals live, forming a key mechanism through which social structure influences individual 
agency, which in turn reproduces structure. Scholars advocating the reformed view of habit, like 
Merleau-Ponty and Dewey, also recognize that habit emerges in interaction with others, and 
view individuals' capacity of perceiving, forming objectives and acting (in short, agency) as 
constituted by habit (Crossley 2013a; Dewey 1922). Therefore, habit offers the opportunity to 
explore the dispositional aspect of human agency (Crossley 2013a) and appears as a promising 
avenue to further explore the dynamics of structure and agency, particularly in terms of 
investigating how various types of structures contribute to routine dynamics – an issue that has 
only recently begun to be addressed explicitly (Howard-Grenville 2005). Our typology of habit, 
by differentiating between habits that are more or less rigid, and have reinforcing or contrasting 
relationships with deliberation and mindfulness, might offer a way to unpack the situations in 
which the duality of structure and agency is weighed more toward “structure” and replication, or 
“agency” and variation.    
 
4.2.2 The Context of Routines 
 
Our study also responds to a call for extending understanding of the practice perspective 
of routines through greater attention to how context shapes the dynamics of organizational 
routines (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). In extant research, scholars have emphasized 
how routines are enacted simultaneously with other elements of the organizational context, 
which can inhibit flexibility and change in routines. For example, Howard-Grenville (2005) 
argued that there is less flexibility and change in routines when they are strongly embedded in 
structures of the organization, i.e., technological, coordination, and cultural. 
 
While extant work has focused on how relatively stable features of the organizational 
context tend to constrain the dynamics of routines, our study offers some perhaps surprising 
insight into how the dynamics and variability of context can both inhibit and promote 
adaptability and change in routines through habit formation. We argue that stable contextual 
conditions tend to give rise to automatic and contested habits for individuals, and when 
organizational routines are based in those types of habits, we expect limited flexibility and 
change in the routines; moreover, for such routines, accomplishing change will likely require the 
investment of considerable willpower resources. By contrast, we argue that more variable 
conditions enable the formation of skillful and infused habits, which we expect to promote 
adaptability and change in routines. In order to better understand how context affects the 
dynamics of routines, we encourage future research to explore more closely how context affects 
stability and variability in the habits of participants. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, we have developed a typology of habit that offers a more integrative look 
at the concept, drawing upon the different ways habit has been conceptualized in psychology and 
sociology. We also seek to clarify the relationships between habit, deliberation, and mindfulness, 
arguing that habit does not necessarily always preclude deliberation and, especially, mindfulness. 
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As such, habit might offer a suitable micro-foundation for approaches that see organizational 
routines as compatible with mindful organizing. Our typology of habit offers productive 
directions for further research in both the practice and capabilities traditions. By showing areas 
of overlap and contrast between different approaches, and by highlighting related opportunities 
for future research for both capabilities- and practice-based scholars, we hope that habit might in 
the future become a “trading zone” (Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates 2006: 22) in which 
productive dialogue between the capabilities and practice traditions can be established, while 
continuing to benefit from the richness afforded by their differences.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i In describing the receding of habit within sociology, Camic (1986) points to Durkheim and his view that as a 
developing field in search of scientific legitimacy, sociology needed to focus on subject matters that other sciences 
were not studying (i.e., habit belonged to psychology). 
 
ii Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 122) remarked that “I said habitus so as not to say habit.” 
 
iii What constitutes an action or an activity depends on the level of granularity of the analysis. For example, the 
action of starting the car engine could be considered an activity made up of various actions such as inserting the key 
into the ignition, turning the key, etc.  
 
iv While routines research often uses “habit” and “skill” interchangeably, we view skill as a particular form of habit, 
with habit as a broader concept. 
 
v Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (1999) build on Langer (1989) in their treatment of organizational mindfulness, and 
emphasize interpretive work and cognitive differentiation. However, Weick and Sutcliffe (2006: 517) also argue that 
“when people enrich the distinctions they make, their efforts begin to resemble practices associated with 
mindfulness meditation (i.e., Eastern pathways to mindfulness). As a result, their experience becomes less mediated 
by concepts and more nonconceptual.” 
 
vi Competing tensions, such as seeking efficiency and needing flexibility, often surface in routines. Viewed through 
the lens of organizational paradox (Smith and Lewis 2011), routines scholars have tended to focus on different 
responses for accommodating these tensions, with capabilities-based scholars emphasizing spatial and temporal 
separation (e.g., standard phases of efficiency-seeking functioning of operational routines vs. change phases in 
which operational routines are modified), while practice-based scholars emphasize a synthetic view in which 
routines are simultaneously stable and dynamic. 
 
 
